Content Security Policy (CSP) is a recent W3C standard introduced to prevent and mitigate the impact of content injection vulnerabilities on websites. In this article, we introduce a formal semantics for the latest stable version of the standard, CSP Level 2. We then perform a systematic, large-scale analysis of the effectiveness of the current CSP deployment, using the formal semantics to substantiate our methodology and to assess the impact of the detected issues. We focus on four key aspects that affect the effectiveness of CSP: browser support, website adoption, correct configuration, and constant maintenance. Our analysis shows that browser support for CSP is largely satisfactory, with the exception of a few notable issues. However, there are several shortcomings relative to the other three aspects. CSP appears to have a rather limited deployment as yet and, more crucially, existing policies exhibit a number of weaknesses and misconfiguration errors. Moreover, content security policies are not regularly updated to ban insecure practices and remove unintended security violations. We argue that many of these problems can be fixed by better exploiting the monitoring facilities of CSP, while other issues deserve additional research, being more rooted into the CSP design.
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can be accidentally overlooked; thus, content injections are still pervasive on the Web [20] . This motivated the development of complementary in-depth defense mechanisms aimed at mitigating the effects of a successful content injection [8, 12, 17, 18, 25] . Among these, Content Security Policy (CSP) is by far the most popular and well-established solution, being standardized by the W3C and supported by all major web browsers [25, 29] .
CSP is a language for defining restrictions on the functionality of webpages, ideally to limit their capabilities to the least set of privileges they need to work correctly. Most notably, CSP significantly mitigates the dangers of a successful content injection by disallowing the execution of inline scripts and by banning a few dangerous functions used for turning strings into code, such as the infamous eval. These default restrictions can be explicitly relaxed to simplify deployment, though this is strongly discouraged by the standard. Moreover, CSP allows the specification of constraints on content inclusion based on a white-listing mechanism, whereby different content types, such as images or scripts, are bound to the sole set of origins allowed to supply that content. This way, injected markup elements can only be abused to load contents from white-listed web origins, thus further reducing the room for attacks.
Research Goals and Contributions
Our main goal is to assess the state of the art in the use and effectiveness of CSP as a security mechanism for websites against content injection attacks. To better understand the standard, we first define a formal semantics for its latest stable version, CSP Level 2 (Section 3). The semantics provides a rigorous and concise representation of the most important elements of CSP, which allows us to substantiate our analysis methodology and to formally assess the impact of the detected practical issues.
We focus on four key aspects affecting the effectiveness of CSP:
(1) Browser support: We design a set of experiments to test the browser implementations of the CSP specifications. We run the experiments in all major web browsers, including their mobile variants. We report on the outcome of the experiments, highlighting the cases in which at least one browser does not behave as expected and discussing their security import. Our investigation reveals a dangerous behavior of Microsoft Edge and a subtle quirk in all browser implementations, which deserves a careful security analysis (Section 4). (2) Website adoption: We collect the content security policies sent by the Alexa Top 1M web-
sites [2] and analyze them to shed light on the current state of CSP deployment, which turns out to be quite limited. We also investigate which features and use cases of CSP are popular among web developers and which ones are largely ignored, identifying a few common bad practices (Section 5). (3) Correct configuration: We identify five common classes of misconfigurations made by web developers when writing content security policies and discuss their security and usability import. We show that the very large majority of the websites that we surveyed deploy content security policies that do not provide robust defenses against script injection (Section 6). (4) Constant maintenance: We repeat the crawling of the Alexa Top 1M for 22 weeks, automatically collecting both CSP headers and violations to the policies contained therein. We identify websites committing to CSP or abdicating from it during this timespan and analyze how existing policies changed during the 22 weeks, discussing good and bad practices in the wild. Finally, we investigate correlations between changes to policies and policy violations, concluding that content security policies change less frequently than needed (Section 7).
(1) The security considerations about inaccurate browser implementations of CSP presented in [4] are now backed up by theorems and formal proofs. ( 2) The syntactic conditions defined in [4] to detect policies vulnerable to script injection are proved correct with respect to the formal model. Moreover, we identify new syntactic conditions on policies that prove the absence of these vulnerabilities under a few additional assumptions. ( 3) The study of the evolution of the CSP deployment presented in [4] has been significantly expanded and automated by developing a policy comparison tool, which implements the permissiveness analysis defined in the formal model and allows us to check how policies evolve over time.
We also performed a number of useful revisions, additions, and updates to the original study, most notably by significantly enlarging its scope (to more than 16,000 websites) and by performing a more systematic deduplication of the collected data.
BACKGROUND: CONTENT SECURITY POLICY
We provide a brief introduction to CSP. This section contains just enough information to understand the essence of the CSP specifications and our main technical contributions. We refer to the official documentation for full details about the standard [29] .
Overview
A content security policy is a list of directives restricting content inclusion for webpages by means of a white-listing mechanism. Directives bind content types to lists of sources from which a CSPprotected webpage is allowed to include resources of that specific type. For instance, the directive img-src https://a.com specifies that a webpage can only load images from the host a.com via the HTTPS protocol. CSP is a client-server defense mechanism: content security policies are specified by web developers using HTTP(S) headers or meta elements in HTML pages, while their enforcement is performed at the browser side on a per-page basis. Content security policies can be run in two modes: the enforcement mode applies all the content restrictions specified by the policy while the report-only mode does not restrict the website functionality, but it just tells browsers to log policy violations in the JavaScript console. In both modes, the report-uri directive can be used to specify to a URI where browsers should send JSON-based security reports when a policy violation occurs. Policies in enforcement mode are sent in the Content-Security-Policy header; report-only policies are sent in the Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only header. Table 1 reports selected directive types available in CSP: if a content security policy does not include an explicit directive for a given content type, the default-src directive is applied to it 
Directive
Restricted Contents img-src Images script-src JavaScript, XSLT style-src Stylesheets (CSS) connect-src Targets of XMLHttpRequest default-src Content without explicit directives as a fallback. Allowed sources for content inclusion are specified using source expressions, a sort of regular expression used to express sets of web origins in a compact way. Content inclusion from a URL is allowed only if the URL matches any of the source expressions specified for the appropriate content type. The relevant details of the matching algorithm will be formalized in Section 3; for now, we assume the existence of such an algorithm.
The informal semantics of a content security policy can be summarized as follows:
(1) inline scripts are blocked, unless the source expression 'unsafe-inline' is included in the script-src directive (or in the default-src directive in absence of script-src); (2) inline styles are blocked, unless the source expression 'unsafe-inline' is included in the style-src directive (or in the default-src directive in absence of style-src); (3) the conversion of strings into code via eval and similar functions is blocked, unless the source expression 'unsafe-eval' is in the script-src directive (or in the default-src directive in absence of script-src); (4) some dangerous methods of the CSS Object Model-such as insertRule-are blocked, unless the source expression 'unsafe-eval' is in the style-src directive (or in the default-src directive in absence of style-src); (5) the inclusion of content of type t from a URL u is allowed if and only if one of these conditions holds: (a) u matches a source expression in t-src; (b) there is no t-src directive and u matches a source expression in default-src; (c) there is neither t-src nor default-src.
If more than one content security policy is deployed on the same webpage, each policy must be individually enforced following the rules above.
CSP Versions
The core of CSP is a fine-grained mechanism for white-listing content inclusions, defined in the CSP 1.0 specifications [28] and summarized in the previous section. The latest stable version of the standard, called CSP Level 2 [29] , includes a number of new features on top of the original CSP core. One of the major changes with respect to CSP 1.0 is the introduction of mechanisms to relax the above restrictions on inline scripts and stylesheets without falling back to the dramatic absence of security guarantees provided by 'unsafe-inline.' Specifically, CSP Level 2 allows one to white-list individual inline scripts and styles by using nonces or hashes.
The 'nonce-$value' source expression white-lists inline scripts or styles with a nonce attribute equal to $value, while the 'shaXXX-$value' source expression white-lists inline scripts or styles whose hash (computed using the shaXXX algorithm) is $value. Nonces should be random values that are freshly generated upon each page request. The same nonce attribute can be assigned to multiple scripts or styles so that multiple inline elements can be white-listed using v ::= {se 1 , . . . , se n } ( n ∈ N) Source expressions se ::= h | unsafe-inline | hash(str) Hosts h ::= self | sc | he | (sc, he) ( sc inl) Host expressions he ::= * | * .str | str just a single nonce, which simplifies policy specification. Hashes, however, provide better security guarantees than nonces because they also provide an integrity guarantee for the white-listed scripts or styles, while nonces can be reused to white list arbitrary inline elements when they fall under the control of an attacker, for instance, because they are easily predictable or not freshly generated upon each page request.
Example 2.1. To exemplify the most important concepts of CSP, consider the following content security policy:
script-src https://a.com 'nonce-a33f5b005d'; img-src https://b.com; default-src https://* This policy allows the inclusion of scripts from https://a.com and the inclusion of images from https://b.com. Inline scripts are blocked unless their script tag is marked with a nonce attribute set to a33f5b005d. Contents that are not scripts or images, e.g., stylesheets, can be included from every host, provided that they are delivered using the HTTPS protocol.
We conclude this section by mentioning the current working draft of the CSP specifications, called CSP Level 3 [32] . The main extension with respect to CSP Level 2 is the introduction of the 'strict-dynamic' source expression, designed to simplify the process of recursive script inclusion without triggering security violations. Our study focuses on CSP Level 2, because it is the latest stable version of the standard and a candidate recommendation of the W3C, but the formal semantics presented in the next section can be straightforwardly adapted to the current draft specification of CSP Level 3.
FORMAL ANALYSIS OF CSP LEVEL 2
We introduce here a denotational semantics for a significant fragment of CSP Level 2, which we call CoreCSP. We then discuss some security applications of the semantics: reasoning on the import of inaccurate browser implementations, checking vulnerability to script injection, and comparing policy permissiveness.
Syntax and Semantics of CoreCSP

Syntax.
We let str range over the denumerable set of strings. The syntax of policies is shown in Table 2 , in which we use dots (. . .) to denote additional omitted elements of a syntactic category. We assume a finite number of content types and an arbitrary number of schemes.
The syntax of CoreCSP is a rather direct counterpart of the syntax of CSP Level 2. A policy p is either a list of directives d or the conjunction of two policies p 1 + p 2 . Directives, in turn, bind content types t to directive values v; their syntax also includes a default directive, applied to all content not restricted by other directives. Directive values are sets of source expressions se, whose semantics will be explained in the following.
A few points of the syntax are worth discussing:
(1) We assume the existence of a distinguished scheme inl, used to identify inline scripts and styles. This scheme cannot syntactically occur inside policies, but it is convenient to define their formal semantics. (2) We model only hashes rather than nonces as a mechanism to white list individual inline scripts and styles. The reason is that it is not possible to define the semantics of a policy using nonces based just on the syntax of the policy itself. One would also need to model the contents of the HTML page in which the policy is enforced to identify the white-listed elements, based on the value of their nonce attribute. (3) We define directive values as sets of source expressions rather than lists of source expressions. This difference is uninteresting in practice since lists of source expressions are always parsed as sets. (4) For simplicity, we do not model ports and paths in the syntax of source expressions. They can be easily added to the formalism at the cost of making the technical details more tedious without adding much to the formalization insights.
To simplify the formalization, we only consider well-formed policies according to the following definition.
Assumption 1 (Well-formed Policies). We assume that CSP policies are well-formed, i.e., for each directive value v occurring therein, we have that unsafe-inline ∈ v implies hash(str) v.
The syntax of CSP Level 2 is more liberal than this, allowing the specification of policies violating the constraint above. However, in practice, there is no loss of generality in focusing only on wellformed policies, since if both unsafe-inline and hash(str) occur in the same directive, only one of them is enforced by web browsers. Specifically, browsers compliant with CSP 1.0 would ignore hash(str), while browsers supporting CSP Level 2 would ignore unsafe-inline. We assume that CSP policies are simplified like this before being represented in CoreCSP.
The definition of the formal semantics is based on three main entities: locations are uniquely identifiable sources of contents, subjects are HTTP(S) webpages enforcing a content security policy, and objects are content available to subjects for inclusion.
Definition 3.1 (Location).
A location is a pair l = (sc, str), where str is a string representing a hostname. We let L stand for the denumerable set of all locations and let L range over subsets of L.
Definition 3.2 (Subject).
A subject is a pair s = (l, str), where l = (sc, str ) with sc ∈ {http, https} and str is a string representing a path.
Definition 3.3 (Object).
An object is a pair o = (l, str). We let O stand for the denumerable set of all objects and let O range over subsets of O.
We use the projection functions π 1 (·) and π 2 (·) to extract the components of a pair, be it a location, a subject, or an object. We also make the following typing assumption, which ensures that objects can only be white listed for inclusion by using directives of the expected type. This is useful in developing a faithful model of CSP. 
Assumption 2 (Typing of Objects
self s {π 1 (s)} sc s {l | π 1 (l ) = sc} * s {l | π 1 (l ) {data, blob, fsys, inl}} str s {l | π 1 (π 1 (s)) π 1 (l ) ∧ π 2 (l ) = str} * .str s {l | π 1 (π 1 (s)) π 1 (l ) ∧ ∃str : π 2 (l ) = str .str} (sc, str) s {(sc, str)} (sc, * .str) s {l | π 1 (l ) = sc ∧ ∃str : π 2 (l ) = str .str} (sc, * ) s {l | π 1 (l ) = sc} unsafe-inline s {l | π 1 (l ) = inl} hash(str) s {(inl, str)}
Semantics of Source
Expressions. The judgment se s L defines the semantics of source expressions. It reads as follows: the source expression se allows the subject s to include contents from the locations L. The formal definition is given in Table 3 , in which we let denote the smallest reflexive relation on schemes such that http https.
A brief explanation follows. The self source expression denotes only the location of the subject. A scheme source expression sc denotes all the locations with that scheme. The * source expression white lists all the locations, with the exception of those with scheme data, blob, fsys, or inl. A string source expression str denotes the locations (http, str) and (https, str) for HTTP subjects, but only the location (https, str) for HTTPS subjects. The semantics of * .str follows the same logic on the scheme, but any location whose second component has .str as a suffix is white listed. The semantics of (sc, str), (sc, * .str), and (sc, * ) is straightforward. The unsafe-inline source expression denotes all the locations with scheme inl, while the hash(str) source expression only white lists the location (inl, str). Having defined the semantics of source expression, the semantics of directive values v is defined as expected:
Semantics of Policies.
The semantics of policies readily follows from the semantics of directive values. It is based on a lookup operator that, given a list of directives d and a content type t, returns the directive value v, which determines the restrictions enforced by d when including contents of type t. Intuitively, v is the value bound to the first t-src directive in d, if any; otherwise, it is the value bound to the first default-src directive. If there is not even a default directive in d, the wildcard { * } is returned. The formal definition of the lookup operator is given next.
Definition 3.4 (Lookup)
. Given a list of directives d and a content type t, we define the syntactic lookup operator d.t as follows:
We then define the lookup operator d ↓ t as follows:
The judgment p s t O defines the semantics of policies. It reads as follows: the policy p allows the subject s to include as contents of type t the objects O. The formal definition is given in Table 4 . Rule (D-Val) allows the inclusion of the objects of the appropriate type whose locations 
are white listed by the directive value v returned by the lookup operator. Rule (D-Conj) defines the semantics of policies built using the conjunction operator + by intersecting the sets of objects white listed by the individual policies. In other words, a content inclusion is allowed if and only if it is allowed by all the individual policies. 
Formal Reasoning on CSP Policies
We now set the ground for the security applications of the semantics we anticipated. We do this by defining a few technical ingredients that are useful in supporting formal reasoning on CSP policies: a preorder on source expressions characterizing their permissiveness and a smart lookup operator on policies defining the restrictions enforced by multiple conjuncted policies in terms of a single directive value.
Policy Normalization.
The semantics of policies depends on the subject enforcing them, which complicates formal reasoning. We thus introduce a class of policies, called normal policies, whose semantics does not depend on the enforcing subject. We then show that any policy can be translated into an equivalent normal policy by using a subject-directed compilation. The syntax of normal policies is obtained by replacing h in Table 2 with h, where
Normal source expressions and normal directive values are defined accordingly.
Definition 3.6 (Normalization).
Given a source expression se and a subject s, we define the normalization of se under s, written se s , as follows: For example, building on Example 3.5, the normalization of the policy p under the subject s is the following policy:
It is easy to note that the sets of objects white listed by p and p s coincide. This is, in fact, a general result. 
Lemma 3.7 (Properties of Normalization
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Smart Lookup.
The relation is a powerful tool to reason about the security of policies, since the set of objects that can be included according to a policy ultimately depends on the locations white listed via its directive values. To effectively use on arbitrary policies, however, there are a couple of issues left to be addressed:
(1) A policy p may enforce multiple restrictions on the same content type t, specifically when p = p 1 + p 2 for some p 1 , p 2 . In this case, multiple directive values must be taken into account when reasoning about the inclusion of contents of type t.
(2) A policy p may enforce restrictions on the inclusion of contents of type t by using directives of two different formats: t-src or default-src. One has then to ensure that the appropriate directive value is taken into account.
We address these issues by defining a smart lookup operator p ⇓ t that, given a policy p and a content type t, returns a directive value that captures all the restrictions put in place by p on t. This operator is based on the following definition of meet of two normal directive values.
Definition 3.9 (Meet).
Given two normal directive values v 1 , v 2 , we define their meet as
The definition of the smart lookup operator is now simple. If a policy is defined as the conjunction of multiple policies, the smart lookup operator computes the meet of the directive values returned by the standard lookup operator on the individual conjuncted policies. Otherwise, it just behaves like the standard lookup operator.
Definition 3.10 (Smart Lookup)
. Given a normal policy p and a content type t, we define p ⇓ t as follows:
The desired property of the smart lookup operator can be formalized as follows.
Lemma 3.11 (Correctness of Smart Lookup). For all normal policies p, subjects s and content types t, we have that p s
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We conclude this section with a mild technical assumption, which ensures that all the whitelisted locations host at least one object of the expected type. In other words, we assume that policies do not contain any useless information: if a location is white listed, something is available for inclusion therein.
Assumption 3 (Proper White Listing). For all normal policies p, subjects s and content types t,
we have that p ⇓ t s L implies that for all l ∈ L there exists o ∈ O t such that π 1 (o) = l.
Application 1: Reasoning on Browser Implementations
CoreCSP is a faithful model of the official CSP Level 2 specifications [29] . It is well known that browsers do not always implement meticulously existing specifications, however, and the security import of these inaccuracies may not be obvious. In our investigation, we observed that CSP is no exception because Microsoft Edge does not follow CSP specifications when enforcing multiple policies on the same page (see Section 4.3) and all the major browsers implement unexpected behavior when dealing with inline scripts and styles (see Section 4.4).
When these inaccurate browser implementations are identified, e.g., by code review or testing, one can use CoreCSP to get a formal understanding of their security import: see the aforementioned sections for such an analysis.
Application 2: Vulnerability to Script Injection
Content injection may take different forms and may be exploited to mount a number of attacks, such as UI redressing. In our view, however, the most dangerous form of client-side content injection on the Web is XSS, where arbitrary attacker-controlled scripts are injected in benign webpages. Our goal here is defining syntactic checks on content security policies under which a content injection can lead to arbitrary script injection despite a correct policy enforcement. We use these checks to automate the security analysis of existing content security policies deployed in the wild (see Section 6.6).
Formal Definition.
We start by defining the threat model. We represent an attacker A ⊆ L just as a set of locations identifying attacker-controlled content, which we call tainted objects. This general model is useful to reason about white-list safety: indeed, the policy semantics is agnostic to the trust of web hosts, but our threat model allows one to discriminate between a policy that white lists good.com and a policy that white lists evil.com as legitimate sources for script inclusion.
Definition 3.12 (Tainted Objects).
Given an attacker A, the set of its tainted objects of type t is defined as
If a policy allows the inclusion of tainted objects, then there is a potential security issue that deserves scrutiny. This is formalized as follows. This threat model is very general. In this work, however, we find it useful to focus on a particular class of attackers modelling the standard web attacker from the literature, which is normally used when reasoning about content injection [1] . The web attacker operates a set of malicious websites and can respond to HTTP(S) requests sent to the sites with arbitrary content. We assume that the attacker set up HTTPS on the attacker's web servers. Also, the attacker can attempt to exploit code injection vulnerabilities by means of inline scripts and data URIs, which provide a means to include inline elements as if they were external resources. Note that the attacker's ability to inject inline scripts is limited by the use of hashes in content security policies.
Definition 3.13 (Vulnerability to Injection
Definition 3.14 (Web Attacker).
Let H , I ∅ be sets of strings representing hosts and identifiers of inline scripts, respectively. We define the web attacker W [H , I ] as
We let W stand for the canonic web attacker W [{attacker.com}, {att}], where att represents the identifier of a malicious inline script.
Syntactic Checks.
Having defined the threat model, we can introduce the following notion of liberal source expression. Liberal source expressions constitute a poor mechanism to restrict script inclusion, since some of the locations that they white list are controlled by the canonic web attacker.
Definition 3.15 (Liberality).
A source expression is liberal if and only if it is the wildcard * , the unsafe-inline source expression, or any of the schemes http, https, or data. A directive value v is liberal iff it contains at least one liberal source expression.
The explanation of the definition is quite intuitive: the wildcard * and the HTTP(S) scheme include attacker.com as a valid source for content inclusion, while unsafe-inline and data enable the injection of inline scripts.
The first result of this section provides a syntactic criterion to check whether a policy leaves a website vulnerable to script injection attacks (XSS). 
This can be shown by a case analysis on se:
• se = https: analogous to the previous case;
Given a web attacker, it is also possible to check whether a policy provides protection against script injection attempts by that attacker. We do this by identifying the set of the sole source expressions that may open a breach for script injection.
Definition 3.17 (Weakness). Given a web attacker W [H , I ], a source expression se is weak against W [H , I ] iff any of the following conditions holds true:
(1) there exists str ∈ H such that (http, str) src se or (https, str) src se; (2) there exists str ∈ I such that hash(str) src se; (3) we have se src data.
A directive value v is weak against W [H , I ] iff it contains at least one source expression that is weak against W [H , I ].
We can prove that the presence of weak source expressions is a necessary condition for a successful script injection by the considered web attacker. 
Theorem 3.18 (Protection against XSS
We then perform a case distinction on the structure of π 1 (o) and show for each case that v must include a weak source expression:
• π 1 (o) = (http, str) with str ∈ H : Since (http, str) ∈ L, we have that {(http, str)} v by Lemma 3.8. This means that there exists se ∈ v such that (http, str) src se; hence, v is weak against W [H , I ].
• π 1 (o) = (https, str) with str ∈ H : Analogous to the previous case.
• π 1 (o) = (inl, str) with str ∈ I : Since (inl, str) ∈ L, we have that {(inl, str)} v by Lemma 3.8. This means that there exists se ∈ v such that (inl, str) src se; hence, v is weak against W [H , I ].
• π 1 (o) = (data, str): Since (data, str) ∈ L, we must have that {(data, str)} v by Lemma 3.8. This means that there exists se ∈ v such that (data, str) src se. An inspection of the rules defining the src relation (in Table 5 ) shows that se = (data, he) for some he or se = data; hence, se src data and v is weak against W [H , I ].
Application 3: Policy Permissiveness Analysis
We now formalize a notion of policy permissiveness and identify syntactic checks to prove or disprove that one policy is no more permissive than another one. We implemented these checks in a policy comparison tool developed in PHP, which we make publicly available online 1 . This tool allows one to analyze the evolution over time of existing content security policies deployed in the wild and to understand the import of the observed policy changes (see Section 7.3).
Formal Definition.
Given the denotational style of the formal semantics, it is very natural and intuitive to compare the permissiveness of two policies by comparing the sets of their whitelisted objects. 
Definition 3.19 (Permissiveness
We have that p 1 ≤ p 2 . However, the syntactic structure of the two policies is different, since p 2 has less directives than p 1 . Also, the directive values occurring in p 2 are more permissive than those in p 1 . This may be due to the addition of new source expressions ({a.com} vs. {a.com, c.com}) or the relaxation of existing ones ({https} vs. { * }). 
Syntactic
Example 3.22. Pick again the policies p 1 and p 2 from Example 3.20 and consider the subject s = ((https, example.com), /home). We have that p 1 s = script-src {(https, a.com)}, style-src {(https, b.com)}, default-src {https} p 2 s = script-src {(https, a.com), (https, c.com)}, default-src { * } Thus, for the different content types script and style, we get that
We then conclude that p 1 ≤ s p 2 .
TESTING BROWSER SUPPORT FOR CSP
We devised a number of experiments to test to what extent the implementation of CSP in major web browsers is compliant with CSP Level 2 specifications [29] , at least when it comes to the fragment formalized in CoreCSP. Our goal was finding both subtle corner cases of CSP specifications that deserve clarification and plain deviations with respect to expected browser behaviors. When an unexpected behavior emerged from our experiments, we used CoreCSP to assess its security import.
Methodology
We manually created a small set of HTML pages sending content security policies in enforcement mode, designing them so that the browser behavior upon policy enforcement is made explicit by visual clues. We make these pages available online, along with a brief explanation of each of them 2 . We do not claim that our investigation tested all the corner cases of the specifications, but we are confident of the effectiveness of our test suite in providing good coverage of the most relevant aspects of CSP that are commonly used, as formalized by the CoreCSP semantics. We leave as future work the automated generation of more comprehensive test cases using the formal semantics. 
Passed Tests
All browsers successfully passed the following tests:
(1) Enforcing multiple directives: The syntax of CSP allows the inclusion of multiple directives for the same content type (e.g., script-src) in the same header. The expected behavior in this case is that only the first directive is enforced, while the others are ignored. (2) Default scheme assignment: The syntax of source expressions includes host source expressions of the form a.com. In these cases lacking an explicit scheme, CSP specifications mandate a default scheme assignment based on the scheme of the page deploying this policy: a.com must be interpreted as https://a.com in HTTPS pages and as both http://a.com and https://a.com in HTTP pages. (3) Wildcard: In CSP Level 2, the * source expression is a wildcard matching any URL whose scheme is not blob, data, or filesystem. These schemes are considered dangerous, since the content of URLs with these schemes is often derived from a response body and may be under the control of an attacker. Note that in CSP 1.0, the wildcard simply matches any URL. (4) Ambiguities on inline scripts: The script-src directive may include both 'unsafeinline' and nonces or hashes white listing individual inline scripts. In this case, the CSP specifications mandate that only inline scripts white listed using nonces or hashes are allowed to run. Recall that nonces and hashes are not available in CSP 1.0.
Enforcing Multiple Policies
Multiple content security policies can be specified for the same webpage in different headers. CSP specifications recommend that, if multiple policies are present on the same page, all of them must be individually enforced. Our experiments assessed that all browsers behave according to the specifications but for Microsoft Edge, which concatenates policies included in different headers and enforces only the first encountered directive for each content type. For instance, if the first header includes the directive script-src a.com b.com and the second header includes the directive script-src a.com c.com, the protected page can load scripts from both a.com and b.com in Microsoft Edge, though only a.com should be a valid source for script inclusion based on CSP specifications. Though the presence of multiple headers with different directives for the same content type may sound strange at first, this situation may happen in the presence of security gateways and web application firewalls run by large organizations [29] . In these cases, the behavior of Microsoft Edge is more permissive than CSP specifications and may leave room for attacks. We can formally prove that the implementation of CSP provided by Microsoft Edge is potentially dangerous, i.e., it can only make policies more permissive than intended. To encode the behavior of Microsoft Edge in our semantics, we define a linearization operator (denoted by | · |). This operator removes the pluses from the syntax of policies, thus squeezing multiple conjuncted policies into a single list of directives. The operational behavior of Microsoft Edge can be encoded in our formalism by assuming that all policies are linearized by the browser before being enforced.
Definition 4.1 (Linearization).
Given a policy p, we define its linearization |p| as: 
The proof is by case analysis, using the definition of 
We then use observation (b) to show that 
By combining Equations (1) and (2), we establish that p s ⇓ t |p| s ⇓ t, as desired.
Blocking Inline Elements
A central design choice of CSP is that inline scripts are disabled unless otherwise specified, for instance, by using 'unsafe-inline' [25] . However, we observed in all tested browsers a weird, unexpected difference in the treatment of inline scripts between the following two policies:
(1) img-src www.example.com; (2) img-src www.example.com; default-src *.
Our experiments revealed that the first policy allows the execution of inline scripts while the second one does not, despite the fact that the default sources for script inclusion must be set to the wildcard * in both cases and * does not white list inline scripts. This mismatch is potentially confusing for web developers and not compliant with CSP specifications. More generally, we observed that any policy that lacks both a script-src directive and a default-src directive unexpectedly allows the execution of inline scripts.
Despite our initial concerns, the security import of this unexpected behavior is minor since neither of the two policies puts any restriction on the set of URLs white listed for script inclusion. This means that an attacker does not really need to inject an inline script to attack a website deploying any of the two policies above, which are equally vulnerable. Under both policies, arbitrary script injection could be performed by first hosting a malicious script on an attacker-controlled website and then injecting a script tag loading the script in the target webpage.
We can formally prove this claim. Again, the idea is to define an operator that transforms policies so that the incorrect behavior implemented by web browsers is hard coded in the syntax of the policy, as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Default Extension
The following theorem formalizes that the adoption of the default extension does not make more policies vulnerable to script injection, since it only forces the attacker to choose a different attack vector to circumvent already vulnerable policies. 
Theorem 4.4 (Assessing Default Extension
] script ∅ by the induction hypothesis.
Scheme Relaxation
The 'self' source expression identifies the origin of the webpage deploying a content security policy. Since web origins are defined as triples-including a scheme, a hostname, and a port number [3] -a directive such as img-src 'self' enforced at http://a.com should only allow the inclusion of images from a.com over HTTP. We noticed that only Microsoft Edge and Safari strictly follow the CSP specification when interpreting 'self'. Mozilla Firefox and Chromium are instead more liberal, since the previous directive actually allows the inclusion of images from a.com over both HTTP and HTTPS. We observed that Mozilla Firefox and Chromium also implement this scheme relaxation in other cases, i.e., any origin with an HTTP scheme in a directive also allows the inclusion of contents served over HTTPS from the same domain. Though it is not mentioned in the CSP specification, the scheme relaxation mechanism implemented in Mozilla Firefox and Chromium looks perfectly sensible since it is secure and more convenient for writing policies. We noticed that this more liberal behavior is recommended in the current draft of CSP Level 3 [32] .
ANALYSIS OF CSP DEPLOYMENT
To evaluate the deployment of CSP and investigate the trends in its adoption, we performed weekly crawls of the homepages of the Alexa Top 1M [2] websites from March 2016 to August 2016, collecting their content security policies.
Methodology
We accessed the homepage of each website using both HTTP and HTTPS, and we collected the content security policies received in the corresponding HTTP(S) responses. We then implemented a policy transformation procedure, which replaces variable policy elements such as nonces and report URIs with fixed placeholders and sorts directive names in alphabetical order, and we ran a deduplication procedure on the transformed data. We finally built a dataset containing the first policy in enforcement mode and the first policy in report-only mode sent by each website, if any. (The other collected policies are used in Section 7.) An important caveat applies to our dataset: since content security policies are deployed per page and we only crawled the homepages of the websites, it is possible that we missed policies deployed on internal pages, e.g., used to protect private areas, or located at subdomains. However, being more comprehensive would require a significant engineering effort and the creation of personal accounts at the crawled websites, a process that is notoriously hard to automate [6] .
Current Adoption of CSP
Overall, we found 10,684 distinct content security policies in 16,353 websites. We found only a dozen websites defining their policies via meta elements, while all the other websites used CSP headers. The policies are divided as follows: 2,505 policies in enforcement mode and 8,179 policies in report-only mode. Out of the 16,353 websites, we found 10,310 websites running CSP in enforcement mode and 10,729 websites using the report-only mode of CSP. We thus have 4,686 websites implementing both modes, most of which are affiliated with the popular blogging service Blogger. Though the existence of such websites may be unexpected, combining enforcement and report-only mode is actually encouraged by the CSP specification as a good way to enforce a relatively weak policy while monitoring the possibility of enforcing a stricter one.
It is interesting to observe that an earlier study [35] conducted in March 2014 identified only 850 websites using CSP in the Alexa Top 1M. Hence, CSP adoption has significantly expanded in the last two years, approximately of a factor of 10. An inspection of our dataset shows that a number of popular hosting services have currently deployed CSP, including Blogger, Tumblr, and Shopify, among others. This justifies such a significant increase of CSP popularity.
Common Practices in CSP Adoption
Unsafe Inline and Unsafe Eval.
Web developers are strongly encouraged to remove all inline scripts from their websites to reap the biggest benefits from CSP and limit the risks of XSS [36] . However, previous studies assessed that moving inline scripts to external resources is not a trivial task [34] and showed that the large majority of the websites deploying CSP jresort to activating 'unsafe-inline' [35] . Nonces and hashes have been introduced in CSP Level 2 to give web developers the possibility of white listing individual inline scripts and stylesheets. These mechanisms were designed to simplify a large-scale adoption of CSP and it is important to understand whether or not they have been successful so far in replacing the insecure 'unsafe-inline'. We focus only on the 2,505 policies in enforcement mode, since for them we can safely assume a deliberate and fully aware adoption of CSP, which is not obvious for report-only policies.
Out of 2,505 policies, 1,664 include 'unsafe-inline' in a script-src directive (66.4%) without making use of nonces or hashes. Only 4 policies employ hashes to white list their inline scripts (0.2%), while 38 policies rely on nonces (1.5%). This shows that the majority of web developers still enable arbitrary inline scripts in their policies and do not use the new tools available in CSP Level 2 to white list individual inline scripts, although they were designed to minimize code changes to existing websites and simplify the CSP adoption. Nonces appear to be more popular than hashes in the wild, most likely because they are easier to deploy: a single nonce can be used to white list all inline elements of a webpage and nonces do not need to be changed when the code of a white-listed inline script is updated. Somewhat similar findings apply to stylesheets: 1,578 policies include 'unsafe-inline' in a style-src directive (63.0%) without including nonces or hashes, while only 2 policies (0.1%) use hashes to white list stylesheets and none relies on nonces. Note the drop in popularity of nonces with respect to scripts, probably because the threats posed by inline styles are typically less serious than those posed by inline scripts, though practical attacks based on stylesheet injection have been reported in the past [10] .
Finally, we found 1,621 policies (64.7%) including 'unsafe-eval' in a script-src directive and 136 policies (5.4%) including 'unsafe-eval' in a style-src directive. This suggests that the majority of websites using CSP still resort to dynamically transforming strings into code for generic reasons, despite the well-recognized dangers of this programming practice.
Use Cases of CSP.
The original goal of CSP is defining "restrictions that give web application authors control over the content embedded on their site" [25] . However, CSP specifications have recently evolved to include features that are orthogonal to content restriction and it seems that these recent additions to CSP are extremely popular among web developers. In particular, we observed that only 3,832 out of 10,310 websites running CSP in enforcement mode (37.2%) are actually using CSP to implement some form of content restriction, i.e., their policies contain at least one directive of the form t-src . The remaining 6,478 websites essentially use just the following features of CSP:
• upgrade-insecure-requests: This newly proposed directive is not present in the CSP specification, but it is an official addition to the standard [31] . The directive asks web browsers to upgrade to HTTPS a number of HTTP requests sent by CSP-protected webpages to simplify their full transition to HTTPS while avoiding mixed content error. Out of 6,478 websites that do not use CSP for implementing content restrictions, we found 4,985 websites (77.0%) whose content security policy includes only the upgrade-insecure-requests directive. The majority of these websites are hosted by Blogger.
• frame-ancestors: This directive is used to implement frame busting by giving control on whether browsers should be allowed to embed a CSP-protected webpage inside other documents by means of iframes. Out of 6,478 websites that do not use CSP for implementing content restrictions, we found 915 websites (14.1%) using CSP just to implement frame busting. These websites deploy very simple content security policies, such as frame-ancestors 'self', which restricts framing to same-origin pages.
MISCONFIGURATION OF CSP POLICIES
To evaluate whether web developers can correctly write useful content security policies, we performed an in-depth analysis of the policies collected from the Alexa Top 1M [2] , looking for different types of misconfigurations.
Methodology
Systematically detecting misconfigurations in content security policies is challenging, as one needs to define a meaningful notion of misconfiguration independent of the specific use case and that does not require speculation on whether web developers actually enforced what they wanted to enforce. We focus on five classes of inadequate configurations:
(1) Typos and negligence: These policies include trivial syntactic errors in their specification. In these cases, it is completely clear what web developers wanted to enforce, but they specified it incorrectly, e.g., the name of a directive was misspelled. (2) Ill-formed policies: These policies have an unclear intended meaning, e.g., they contain contradictory or unexpected information; (3) Lack of reporting: These policies do not leverage the monitoring facilities of CSP and do not report the presence of CSP violations to web developers. This may lead to policy problems being undetected for a long time. We defined these classes of problems after a preliminary manual investigation of our dataset and devised appropriate queries to automatically catch them in all websites we visited. For the first three classes of misconfigurations, we focused on the dataset including only the first policies delivered by each website during our weekly crawls (10,684 policies). For the last two classes of problems, which are specific to content restriction, we focused only on the subset of the policies in enforcement mode that actually restrict content inclusion in some way, i.e., they contain at least one directive of the form t-src (2,130 policies).
Typos and Negligence
Syntactic errors in content security policies are very easy to catch and fix, but their import on security is significant, because all major web browsers ignore unknown directives and output a warning in the JavaScript console only, which may go unnoticed. If web developers are not careful enough, they may deploy unexpectedly weak content security policies on their websites. In our analysis, we found 14 content security policies containing unknown directives due to obvious typos, such as defalt-src 'self' nfont-src www.myfonts.com report-uri/csp-report
We clarify the security import of these kinds of trivial mistakes: the typo in the first directive leads to the default-src directive being missing from the policy, actually white listing every website as a valid provider of contents without an explicit directive in the policy. Similar considerations apply to errors like the second one, which allows browsers to load fonts from any website (assuming the absence of a stricter default directive). Errors like the third one prevent the generation of CSP violation reports, which may lead to attacks and policy issues going undetected for a long time.
We also noticed 20 content security policies, including formatting errors, e.g., misusing punctuation symbols next to directives or erroneously including CSP header information. A few representative examples are "default-src 'self'; ..." default-src: 'self' default-src='self' Content-Security-Policy default-src 'self'; All these cases lead to (a portion of) the content security policy being skipped by the browser and not correctly enforced, with the risks described above.
Misquoting special source expressions like 'self' or missing the terminating colon when writing a scheme like http: is another kind of error, resulting in the white listing of a nonexistent host. This may lead to the deployment of content security policies that are more restrictive than intended. The impact of these errors on security is thus limited, though they may lead to severe usability issues for website users: for instance, white listing self rather than 'self' prevents the browser from loading same origin contents on a CSP-protected webpage. Notice that this may even convince uncaring web developers to abandon CSP to prevent further usability issues. We found 40 policies with such errors in source expressions.
Ill-Formed Policies
We noticed a number of content security policies with an unclear meaning or using the CSP directives in an unexpected way. These cases are typically hard or even impossible to fix without contacting the original authors of the policies, since it is unclear what they wanted to enforce. For instance, we identified 8 content security policies with the following format:
script-src a.com b.com; c.com
There are at least two legitimate interpretations for incorrect policies like this one. The first possibility is that c.com should be actually part of the script-src directive: it is plausible that the web developer included this source expression after the semicolon by accident. The second possibility, instead, is that the developer forgot to insert, or accidentally erased, the name of the directive preceding c.com. Interestingly, the first error would make the policy more restrictive than intended, while the second error could also make it more liberal, e.g., in the absence of a default-src directive.
We also found 50 websites whose content security policy contains only the character *. This was surprising, since such a policy does not contain any directive and it is ignored by web browsers. The quirk was readily explained when we realized that all 50 websites were developed using ASP.NET; thus, this is likely a default behavior implemented by the web framework when CSP support is not properly configured. Moreover, we identified 62 websites sending an empty content security policy. We believe this may also be connected to the use of a web development framework, but it is also possible that the policy writers believed they would be getting a few basic security benefits just by activating CSP, for instance, assuming that an empty policy prevents the execution of inline scripts as it would be mandated by CSP specifications. Recall, however, that this is not the case in the browsers that we tested and inline scripts are not blocked under an empty policy.
Finally, we found 22 content security policies repeating the same directive (e.g., script-src) multiple times. In these cases, all browsers we tested enforce the first occurrence of the directive and ignore the other ones, as dictated by CSP specifications. It is unclear whether web developers are really aware of how web browsers enforce such policies and why repeated directives are not just removed; thus, it is legitimate to deem these cases at least as bad practices.
Lack of Reporting
We assessed the adoption of the report-uri directive to collect CSP violation reports. This is important, since violations to content security policies without this directive are only logged in the JavaScript console and are much more difficult to systematically detect for web developers, because all violations triggered by website users are lost 3 . We observed that only 706 out of 2,505 policies in enforcement mode (28.2%) specify a report-uri directive; hence, most websites do not implement a robust monitoring of their content security policies. This is surprising, since it is very easy to activate the reporting facilities of CSP and to parse the violation reports.
We also found 51 policies in report-only mode that do not include the report-uri directive. This is a very small fraction (0.6%) of the report-only policies that we collected, but these cases are particularly strange to us since the lack of report-uri significantly reduces the benefits of reporting and questions the purpose of these policies.
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Harsh Policies
We developed a Chromium extension that intercepts the CSP headers of incoming HTTP(S) responses and sets the report-uri directive so that any CSP violation report is redirected to a web server under our control. We then used Selenium to drive Chromium into navigating all twebsites deploying CSP to implement content restrictions, using the extension to automatically detect CSP violations triggered when accessing the homepage of these websites. Surprisingly, we observed that 554 out of 3,832 websites (14.5%) trigger at least one CSP violation when their homepage is accessed by our crawler. Note that this is a subset of the real violations that may be triggered upon navigation, since the crawler does not exercise any website functionality besides page loading. It is interesting to note that 415 of these websites (74.9%) do not use the report-uri directive to collect CSP violation reports; thus, it is perfectly plausible that these violations went unnoticed by web developers. Overall, we collected 960 violation reports: we summarize the reasons for the violations in Table 6 . We observed 12 inline scripts blocked by CSP in 9 websites. Most of these scripts are related to advertisement or other third-party functionalities injected in the webpages, such as site metrics. Interestingly, we also found 88 inline styles blocked by CSP in 80 websites. After a manual investigation of these cases, we noticed they are due to a high number of tiny styles applied to single page elements, e.g., to draw borders around text boxes, which probably went unnoticed.
We then found 6 websites in which a call to eval was stopped by CSP. One site used eval to invoke decodeURIComponent on the base64 encoding of an email address, which is thus not rendered correctly; one site invoked eval to populate some global variables needed to apply style elements to the homepage; one other site made use of eval to check whether the web browser accessing the site was implementing CSP correctly. The last 3 cases were more involved and harder to understand by code inspection, though we noticed that 2 of them seem to be related to the presence of AngularJS 4 .
We also detected 43 violations in 32 websites due to the data: or blob: source expressions being missing in a directive. Most of these cases are related to images (16 violations) and fonts (23 violations), with probably just minor visual consequences.
We finally performed a more systematic evaluation of the 811 violations fired upon requests for HTTP(S) resources that had not been white listed in the content security policy. We observed in particular two recurrent patterns, which cover almost half of the violations that we encountered. First, we noticed 245 violations (30.2%) in 198 websites that are due to advertisement or tools loaded from websites owned by Google, i.e., whose hostname contains the strings google, gstatic or doubleclick. Part of these violations are due to the fact that google.com, often correctly white listed in the content security policy, actually enforces a redirection to google.tld, where tld is a national top-level domain. There is no easy way to accommodate this use case in the current CSP specifications, since the syntax of policies does not allow source expressions of the form google.* [29] . Second, we observed 114 violations (14.1%) in 57 websites due to requests targeted at the same domain of the site or some subdomain of it. Besides the obvious cases in which web developers forgot to include the site domain (or some subdomain of it) in the content security policy, we noticed two other main reasons for this kind of violation:
(1) HTTPS websites requesting contents over HTTP, despite a strong content security policy that prevents this behavior. These cases often occur when source expressions such as 'self' or a.com are included in the policy, since they white list only HTTPS contents when deployed on HTTPS pages. Some of these violations have no visible import, since modern browsers already block requests for active contents sent over HTTP from HTTPS pages in accordance with the mixed content policy [30] . (2) Websites such as http://www.a.com, that load contents from http://a.com, though only http://www.a.com is declared as a valid source for content inclusion (or vice-versa). These cases often occur when the policy uses the 'self' source expression, since 'self' only white lists same origin contents, but http://www.a.com and http://a.com are different origins. The occurrence of these violations thus depends on the user typing the www prefix or not in the address bar when accessing the website, which is undesirable.
Vulnerable Policies
The last analysis we performed is about the vulnerability of existing content security policies to script injection, based on the theory developed in Section 3.4. Using the syntactic checks in Theorem 3.16, we observed that 1,952 out of 2,130 policies implementing some form of content restriction are vulnerable to script injection (91.6%). We report the main reasons for the vulnerability in Table 7 based on the syntactic conditions defined in the theorem. The sum is higher than 2,130, since the same policy may satisfy more than one condition. The majority of the vulnerable policies explicitly disables protection against inline script injection by including 'unsafe-inline' in script-src or default-src, without making use of hashes or nonces: this is the case for 1,875 policies, amounting to the 96.1% of the vulnerable policies. This confirms that inline scripts are still currently pervasive despite the fact that their dangers are well known by web developers.
EVOLUTION OF CSP DEPLOYMENT
We conducted a series of experiments to estimate how the adoption of CSP and existing content security policies are evolving over time. Our goals were detecting relevant trends and assessing whether web developers keep their content security policies constantly updated.
Methodology
In Section 5, we performed weekly crawls of the homepages of the Alexa Top 1M [2] websites from March 2016 to August 2016, collecting their content security policies. In all the experiments performed so far, however, we considered only the first policy in enforcement mode and the first policy in report-only mode sent by each website, if any. To understand the evolution of the CSP deployment, instead, we performed a set of experiments on the full (deduplicated) dataset of policies to track interesting patterns and trends in policy changes.
To carry out our experiments, we relied on two additional artifacts:
(1) A policy comparison tool based on the theory developed in Section 3.5. We used this tool to systematically analyze the effects on permissiveness of the observed policy changes, which we make available online 5 . (2) A dataset of CSP violations collected during our weekly crawls. This was built using the Chromium extension presented in Section 6.5 and iterating the same procedure we applied there over the different weeks. We used this dataset to assess whether the observed policy changes were effective at fixing existing CSP violations.
Changes in CSP Adoption
Let t 1 , . . . , t n be the snapshots of the content security policies collected in our weekly crawls. We say that a website w commits to CSP if there exists a crawl t i such that w does not enforce any policy in t 1 , . . . , t i−1 , but w enforces a policy in t i , . . . , t n . Conversely, a website w abdicates from CSP if there exists a crawl t i such that w enforces a policy in t 1 , . . . , t i−1 , but w does not enforce any policy in t i , . . . , t n . We plot the number of committing and abdicating websites over the different weeks in Figure 1 . We observed many more websites committing to CSP rather than abdicating from it during our weekly crawls, which testifies to a constant growth in CSP deployment, especially in the last weeks. Overall, we found 898 committing websites and 213 abdicating websites in the considered timespan, leading to a net result of 685 new websites adopting CSP over 22 weeks. We observed a relevant peak of 348 committing websites in a single week, most of which were related to Tumblr, a well-known microblogging platform. Interestingly, we also noticed that 68 abdicating websites (31.9%) triggered at least one CSP violation during our crawls. We believe that this nonnegligible amount of policy violations may quite possibly have influenced the choice of abdicating from CSP, likely due to the challenges of configuring CSP correctly. Another relevant trend that we analyzed in the CSP adoption is the transition from report-only to enforcement mode, which should be the most desirable outcome of a preliminary reporting phase. Overall, we found 52 websites changing their policies from report-only to enforcement mode during our crawls, thus fully embracing CSP, while only 14 websites switched their policies from enforcement mode to report-only mode. We also found 13 websites moving to report-only mode just temporarily, most likely to fix issues with their enforced policy. Only 6 websites attempted to enforce a report-only policy at some point, but eventually resorted to switching it back to report-only mode. All of these numbers are quite small compared to the size of our study.
Changes in Content Security Policies
Frequency of Changes.
We evaluated how frequently existing websites change their content security policies. To get uniform and unbiased results, we focused only on the 7,884 websites deploying CSP in all our weekly crawls. Figure 2 reports the distribution (in percentage) of the considered websites with respect to the number of observed policy changes. Though the majority of the websites that we analyzed never changed their content security policies in 22 weeks, there is also a significant number of websites that updated their policies at least once. This is the case for 1,032 websites running CSP in enforcement mode (39.9%) and for 1,078 websites running CSP in report-only mode (20.3%). In general, policies deployed in enforcement mode undergo a many more changes than policies deployed in report-only mode: we believe this is reasonable, because policies in enforcement mode may break website functionality; hence, they require more urgent and frequent maintenance. Moreover, policies in report-only mode may have been deployed just for a preliminary testing or as part of the default configuration of a web development framework with no further update or maintenance on the part of the web developers.
The most surprising cases that we observed in our crawls are websites that changed policy basically every week and contribute to populating the tail of the plot: a manual investigation revealed several pornographic websites that included apparently random strings as valid hostnames for content inclusion. In these websites, it seems that the same contents are regularly relocated on different domains, possibly due to legal reasons or to the implementation of load-balancing techniques.
Security Improvements.
Another point that we wanted to understand is whether web developers are trying to improve their policies by making them robust against script injection attacks. We did not observe significant changes in this respect on the 2,584 websites that enforced CSP during all the weekly crawls: enforced policies that are vulnerable against script injection are not commonly patched to improve their security, for instance, by removing 'unsafe-inline'. However, we observed that the overall percentage of websites whose content security policies are vulnerable to script injection has decreased over time: we show the trend of this percentage in Figure 3 . At the beginning of our weekly crawls, we noticed that 89.0% of the websites enforcing some kind of content restriction were vulnerable to script injection, while only 76.2% of such websites turned out to be vulnerable at the end of our crawls. This decrease is mostly due to a major player, Tumblr, which deployed CSP in July. Remarkably, the policies written by Tumblr use nonces to restrict the execution of inline scripts. We believe that the introduction of nonces in CSP Level 2 may have encouraged the adoption of the standard by a big company such as Tumblr.
Policy Permissiveness.
We analyzed the general trend of the maintenance operations performed by web developers. Our goal was understanding whether changes to existing content security policies typically make these policies more restrictive, more permissive, equivalent (refactoring), or incomparable (some content inclusions are enabled, others are disabled). Overall, we found 6,237 policy changes in our dataset: 4,472 performed on policies in enforcement mode (71.7%) and 1,765 performed on policies in report-only mode (28.3%). The distribution of the effect of the policy changes is shown in Table 8 . In the case of policies in enforcement mode, most changes were intended to make policies more permissive (42.4%). This suggests that web developers perform policy maintenance operations mostly to enable blocked functionalities rather than to improve security. In the case of policies in report-only mode, instead, there is an abundance of interventions that make policies incomparable (60.4%). This is likely due to the fact that these policies are under active development and monitoring, and less refined than policies that are enforced on production websites. Interventions that make policies more restrictive are generally uncommon for both kinds of policies.
We also looked for websites with monotonic behavior, i.e., whose policy changes were always aimed at making policies more permissive or more restrictive. Among 2,584 websites running CSP in enforcement mode in all the weekly crawls, we found 520 websites whose policies became consistently more permissive during our weekly crawls (20.1%), while only only 10 websites always made their policies stricter over time (0.4%). As for the 5,300 websites running CSP in report-only mode in all the weekly crawls, we found less widespread monotonic behaviors: 21 websites always made their policies more permissive, while only 1 website made its policy more restrictive over time. This is due to the fact that changes making policies incomparable are much more common in websites running CSP in report-only mode.
Fixing CSP Violations.
Finally, we looked for correlations between changes to existing content security policies and website functionality being reduced by policy enforcement. We detected 5,072 violations during our crawls, which disappeared at some point in time. For these cases, we compared the content security policy p deployed after the disappearance of the violation and a synthetic policy p v that white lists only the originally blocked contents: if p v ≤ p, the changes performed by the web developers were relevant to fix the violation. We identified only 645 interventions (12.7%) making policies more liberal to enable a blocked functionality, while in 4,427 cases (87.3%), the changes were not related to the violations that we collected. It is interesting to note that the very large majority of the violations disappeared though the underlying content security policy was not actually changed to prevent them: this is likely due to the dynamic nature of modern websites and to the widespread practice of including advertisements. The volume of these transient violations is worrisome, since it means that it is difficult to keep content security policies constantly updated.
Our last experimental finding is about the existence of persistent violations on websites running CSP in enforcement mode. We found 1,294 violations in 506 websites being triggered at every visit of our crawler since they were first encountered (and for at least 1 month). These cases call for policy changes; but, apparently, web developers are not aware of them or have been unable to fix them. We think that the first possibility is the most likely, since 365 out of the 506 websites (72.1%) do not make use of the report-uri directive.
PERSPECTIVE
As a result of our investigation, we observed a few important classes of problems for CSP in its current form. We discuss them in the following, highlighting recent trends and research proposals that go in the right direction to address them. We believe that solving these problems is paramount to a larger and more effective CSP deployment.
CSP Monitoring
The first class of problems that we found comes from a lack (or loss) of useful feedback for web developers when writing content security policies. Though the reporting facilities of CSP are excellent, the vast majority of web developers do not benefit from them since the 71.8% of the policies in enforcement mode that we collected lack a report-uri directive. A simple change that we propose is making browsers output a warning in the JavaScript console when parsing a policy lacking the report-uri directive: none of the browsers that we tested provides this warning. We think that recommending the usage of report-uri would be very helpful to make web developers aware of the importance of reporting and to prevent the deployment of policies that are too strict to work correctly (Section 6.5). Moreover, we propose that the report-uri directive should also be leveraged to collect CSP violation reports whenever unknown directives or ill-formed policies are parsed by the browser. This would be useful in preventing the errors discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. These errors are not widespread, but they are a serious problem in practice because the syntax of CSP is very liberal and browsers are tolerant when parsing policies for the sake of backward compatibility. Reporting these issues while enforcing the well-formed portion of the policy could be a solution that combines backward compatibility with better assistance for web developers.
Inline Elements
The second class of problems affecting CSP is more rooted in its design. Banning inline scripts is certainly important to mitigate code injection, but too many web developers still activate 'unsafe-inline' on their web pages: this is the case for 88.0% of the policies implementing some form of content restriction. Nonces and hashes are a step in the right direction, but their adoption is minuscule: roughly, only 1.5% of the websites running CSP in enforcement mode use nonces or hashes. Moreover, inline scripts are not the only attack vector for code injection: 16.8% of the policies enforcing some content restriction directly include a liberal source expression different from 'unsafe-inline' in its white list for script inclusion.
White Lists
This leads us to the more general observation that white lists require web developers to strike a very delicate balance between security and usability. Carefully designed white lists are difficult to write and maintain, as confirmed by the large number of CSP violations that we encountered on existing websites: as a result, web developers resort to white listing liberal source expressions to prevent functionality issues. It seems that security researchers have different feelings on this important problem: a recent study by [33] questioned the security of white lists and proposed a full transition to nonce-based policies; other efforts, such as CSPAutoGen [22] and the Mozilla Laboratory 6 , aim at developing tools for synthesizing automatically accurate content security policies based on observable browser behaviors.
Dynamic Nature of the Web
A very delicate issue we observed is that CSP violations are often due to elements not totally under the control of the author of the content security policy. In our analysis, we noticed that redirects and advertisement systems are particularly troublesome in this respect. Redirects trigger security violations when a white-listed origin forces a redirection to an origin that is not white listed. Advertisement systems, instead, have very dynamic and unpredictable behavior that hardly fits the nature of a white list; hence, they end up triggering transient security violations. In very recent work, we proposed Compositional CSP, an extension of CSP designed to tackle these issues by assembling content security policies at runtime in the browser [5] . The core idea of Compositional CSP is to start from a simple content security policy including only static dependencies that are easy to identify for page developers while giving to the providers of the imported contents the ability to relax the initial policy to support their dynamic behavior.
RELATED WORK 9.1 CSP Semantics
In concurrent independent work, Liu et al. [16] formalized a core of the CSP 1.0 semantics. The authors used the semantics to reason on policy permissiveness and to design algorithms for removing redundant information from content security policies. However, they did not use the semantics to draw conclusions on the current state of the CSP deployment and to reason on the security of existing practices and implementations, which is the distinguishing feature of this article. It is also worth mentioning that their semantics is not as comprehensive and accurate as ours. Specifically, it does not represent inline elements and the corresponding source expressions available in CSP, such as 'unsafe-inline' and hashes. Also, it does not support the conjunction of policies, source expressions without an explicit scheme and the 'self' source expression: these features are commonly used by existing websites and make the permissiveness analysis more complicated to formalize.
CSP Deployment
Patil and Braun [23] presented an analysis of CSP adoption on the Alexa Top 100k in October 2013. After assessing a limited adoption of the standard, the authors proposed a tool, UserCSP, to automatically synthesize content security policies for existing websites. This is not the only available study; Weissbacher et al. [35] proposed a more recent and in-depth analysis of CSP deployment on the Alexa Top 1M in March 2014. The authors then discussed challenges in CSP adoption and techniques for semiautomated policy generation.
There are many important differences between this article and previous work [23, 35] . First, the focus of this work is quite different, since we are only interested in assessing the trends and effectiveness of the current CSP adoption, while [23, 35] put great emphasis on semiautomated policy generation. Finding effective ways to generate content security policies is definitely an important and intriguing research challenge, which we plan to pursue in future work. On the other hand, the evaluation of CSP effectiveness in [23, 35] is not nearly as comprehensive and systematic as ours: [23, 35] do not include any evaluation of CSP support in existing browsers or any analysis of common errors in policy specification. Also, the security analysis in [23, 35] is much more limited than ours, less rigorous, and not as exhaustive in covering the possible attack vectors for XSS. Only [35] briefly touches on the point of the evolution of CSP, but it is limited to three websites (BBC, CNN, Twitter).
In addition to these methodological aspects, there are also good technological reasons motivating further up-to-date research on CSP. When the studies in [23, 35] were performed, CSP Level 2 did not yet exist. Thus, there is no published research on the latest additions to the CSP standard, e.g., hashes and nonces. Moreover, the adoption of CSP has significantly increased in the last two years: [23] identified only 27 websites running CSP in enforcement mode, [35] found 815 websites, while the present work identified 10,310 websites. This larger scale calls for a more systematic evaluation, as pursued in this article.
Concurrent with the publication of the original version of our study [4] , Weichselbaum et al. [33] presented a large-scale analysis of CSP deployment based on a search engine corpus of around 100 billion pages. The focus of their research is much more specific than ours, providing a perspective on the insecurity of white lists in content security policies. The authors analyzed, in particular, the presence of JSONP endpoints and libraries for symbolic execution on white-listed hosts, which allow script injection attacks, although the underlying content security policy does not relax the default restrictions of CSP on inline scripts. These attacks are not covered by our research, which focuses only on simpler bypasses directly enabled by CSP semantics rather than by the insecurity of white-listed hosts. Their study also analyzed how nonces and the 'strict-dynamic' source expression can be used to write content security policies that are more robust against the aforementioned attacks. However, the analysis in [33] is more vertical than ours and does not discuss a number of points which are covered by our research, such as the browser implementations of CSP, other possible misconfigurations of content security policies, and the analysis of the evolution of CSP deployment in the wild. Moreover, their work does not include any formal analysis.
Other Works on CSP
Van Acker et al. [26] studied the current inability of CSP to prevent data exfiltration attacks. The paper provides empirical evidence that no major web browser implements defenses against data exfiltration in the presence of DNS and resource prefetching, even when the strongest content security policy is put in place, and proposes mitigation techniques.
Hausknecht et al. [9] focused on the tension between content security policies and browser extensions. Since browser extensions can modify the DOM, they may end up making webpages request external resources that are not white listed by the underlying content security policy. The paper proposes a mechanism to endorse CSP modifications performed by browser extensions to strike a good balance between security and extension functionality.
Hothersall-Thomas et al. [11] presented BrowserAudit, a web application implementing a series of more than 400 automated security tests for web browsers. Notably, BrowserAudit also includes a set of 226 tests for CSP 1.0 divided in 10 main families. The compliance tests for CSP implemented in BrowserAudit are simple and quite low level, likely because the scope of BrowserAudit is not limited to CSP but rather embraces browser security as a whole.
Johns [13] identified three limitations of CSP leaving room for dangerous code injections: no prevention of insecure server-side assembly of JavaScript code, lack of control over the content of white-listed external scripts, and lack of control over the number and appearance order of script tags. His paper proposes a framework, called PreparedJS, which complements CSP with solutions (or mitigations) against these attack vectors.
Some et al. [24] investigated the security import of the delicate interactions between CSP and the SOP. If a webpage embeds an iframe from its same origin, the SOP does not isolate the iframe and the distinction between the two entities is immaterial. Since iframes can enforce content security policies independently from their embedders, the security of a page embedding a same-origin iframe is downgraded to the security of the most permissive content security policy between those of the embedder and the iframe.
Large-Scale Analysis of the Web
This article positions itself in the popular research line of large-scale security evaluations of the Web [27] . Just to mention a few relevant works, previous evaluations focused on other aspects of web security, such as remote JavaScript inclusion [19] , DOM-based XSS [15] , mixed content websites [7] , authentication cookies [6] , and HSTS [14] .
CONCLUSION
We performed a large-scale, systematic analysis of four key factors in the effectiveness of CSP: browser support, website adoption, correct configuration, and constant maintenance. Though browser support is largely satisfactory, with the exception of few notable issues, the other three points present significant shortcomings. The deployment of CSP is still quite limited in practice and, more important, there are many errors and weaknesses in existing content security policies, which leave room for security or usability issues. Moreover, content security policies are not regularly updated to ban insecure practices and remove unintended security violations. We argue that many of the problems we found can be fixed by better exploiting the reporting facilities of CSP, but other issues deserve additional research, being more rooted in CSP design.
Overall, CSP is growing, but not nearly as fast and effectively as desired. Given the still relatively limited adoption of the standard, this could be an excellent moment for a retrospective look at its design and motivations based on the main observations that we collected.
APPENDIX
A PROOFS A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.7
We show the three points of the lemma separately. All of them are proved by induction on the structure of the policy p:
(1) We first prove that, for all source expressions se and subjects s, se s is a normal directive value. This is done by observing that all the nonnormal source expressions self, str, and * .str are transformed into a set of normal source expressions by the normalization operator in Definition 3.6, while all the normal source expressions are transformed into the singleton including them. Proof. By a case analysis on the derivation of se 1 src se 2 , observing that the subject used to build the sets of locations is immaterial for normal source expressions:
• sc src * with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: We have that L 1 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc} and L 2 = {l | π 1 (l ) {data, blob, fsys, inl}}; hence, L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
• (sc, he) src * with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: For all locations l ∈ L 1 , we have that π 1 (l ) = sc and L 2 = {l | π 1 (l ) {data, blob, fsys, inl}}; hence, L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
• sc src (sc, * ):
• (sc, he) src sc: For all locations l ∈ L 1 , we have that π 1 (l ) = sc and L 2 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc};
hence, L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
• (sc, str) src (sc, * ): We have that L 1 = {(sc, str)} and L 2 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc}; hence, L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
• (sc, * .str) src (sc, * ): We have that L 1 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc ∧ ∃str : π 2 (l ) = str .str} and L 2 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc}; hence, L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
• (sc, str .str) src (sc, * .str): We have that L 1 = {(sc, str .str)} and L 2 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc ∧ ∃str : π 2 (l ) = str .str}; hence, L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
• hash(str) src unsafe-inline: We have that L 1 = {(inl, str)} and L 2 = {l | π 1 (l ) = inl}; Proof. By a case analysis on the structure of se, using the observation that the number of source expressions occurring in a directive value is finite:
• se = sc: We have that L = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc}. Since L ⊆ L , we must have one of the following subcases: -sc ∈ v: we have that sc src sc by reflexivity; -(sc, * ) ∈ v: we have that sc (sc, * ) by Table 5 ; - * ∈ v with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: we have that sc * by Table 5 ; • se = * : we have that L = {l | π 1 (l ) {data, blob, fsys, inl}}. Since L ⊆ L , we must have that * ∈ v, but * src * by reflexivity.
• se = (sc, str): We have that L = {(sc, str)}. Since L ⊆ L , we must have one of the following subcases: -(sc, str) ∈ v: we have that (sc, str) src (sc, str) by reflexivity; -(sc, * .str ) ∈ v with str = str .str : we have that (sc, str) (sc, * .str ) by Proof. By a case analysis on the structure of se 1 , observing that the subject used to build the sets of locations is immaterial for normal source expressions:
• se 1 = sc: We have that L 1 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc}. Since L 1 ∩ L 2 ∅, we must have one of the following subcases: -se 2 = sc: we have that sc src sc by reflexivity; -se 2 = (sc, he): we have that (sc, he) src sc by Table 5 ; -se 2 = * with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: we have that sc src * by Table 5 .
• se 1 = * : We have that L 1 = {l | π 1 (l ) {data, blob, fsys, inl}}. Since L 1 ∩ L 2 ∅, we must have one of the following subcases:
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-se 2 = sc with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: we have that sc src * by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, he) with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: we have that (sc, he) src * by Table 5 ; -se 2 = * : we have that * src * by reflexivity.
• se 1 = (sc, str): We have that L 1 = {(sc, str)}. Since L 1 ∩ L 2 ∅, we must have one of the following subcases: -se 2 = sc: we have that (sc, str) src sc by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, str): we have that (sc, str) src (sc, str) by reflexivity; -se 2 = (sc, * .str ) with str = str .str : we have that (sc, str) src (sc, * .str ) by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, * ): we have that (sc, str) src (sc, * ) by Table 5 ; -se 2 = * with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: we have that (sc, str) src * by Table 5 .
• se 1 = (sc, * .str): We have that L 1 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc ∧ ∃str : π 2 (l ) = str .str}. Since L 1 ∩ L 2 ∅, we must have one of the following subcases: -se 2 = sc: we have that (sc, * .str) src sc by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, str ) with str = str .str: we have that (sc, str ) src (sc, * .str) by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, * .str): we have that (sc, * .str) src (sc, * .str) by reflexivity; -se 2 = (sc, * ): we have that (sc, * .str) src (sc, * ) by Table 5 ; -se 2 = * with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: we have that (sc, * .str) src * by Table 5 .
• se 1 = (sc, * ): We have that L 1 = {l | π 1 (l ) = sc}. Since L 1 ∩ L 2 ∅, we must have one of the following subcases: -se 2 = sc: we have that (sc, * ) src sc by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, str): we have that (sc, str) src (sc, * ) by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, * .str): we have that (sc, * .str) src (sc, * ) by Table 5 ; -se 2 = (sc, * ): we have that (sc, * ) src (sc, * ) by reflexivity; -se 2 = * with sc {data, blob, fsys, inl}: we have that (sc, * ) src * by Table 5 .
• se 1 = hash(str): We have that L 1 = {(inl, str)}. Since L 1 ∩ L 2 ∅, we must have one of the following subcases: -se 2 = hash(str): we have that hash(str) src hash(str) by reflexivity; -se 2 = unsafe-inline: we have that hash(str) src unsafe-inline by Table 5 .
• se 1 = unsafe-inline: We have that L 1 = {l | π 1 (l ) = inl}. Since L 1 ∩ L 2 ∅, we must have one of the following subcases: -se 2 = hash(str): we have that hash(str) src unsafe-inline by Table 5 ; -se 2 = unsafe-inline: we have that unsafe-inline src unsafe-inline by reflexivity. Proof. We show the two points separately:
Lemma A.4 (Properties of Meet
(1) Let se ∈ v 1 v 2 ; we show that there exists se ∈ v 1 such that se src se , which proves v 1 v 2 v 1 . By definition of , there are two possibilities:
• Let se ∈ {se ∈ v 1 | ∃se ∈ v 2 : se src se }. Since se ∈ v 1 , the conclusion follows by the reflexivity of src .
• Let se ∈ {se ∈ v 2 | ∃se ∈ v 1 : se src se }. Then, there exists se ∈ v 1 such that se src se by definition of this set. 
